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1. Introduction
Is environmental policy beneficial to the environment without hurting the economy? The
answer is not clear-cut. One debate is on the validity of the so-called double dividend hypoth-
esis, this is, the claim that environmental tax could simultaneously improve the environment
(the first dividend) and reduce the economic costs of the tax system (the second dividend),
thereby avoiding the advocated environment-growth trade-off (Parry and Bento, 2000). The
first dividend is commonly acknowledged. But for the second dividend, it is not guaran-
teed to emerge, although possible by returning environmental tax revenues through cuts in
pre-existing distortionary taxes (Bosquet, 2000; Patuelli et al., 2005). One important issue
often ignored in these studies to date is the link between pollution, human health and labor
productivity. For instance, 55 million workers out of 148 million, aged 19-64, had an inability
to concentrate at work because of their own illness or that of a family member in the US in
2003 (Davis et al., 2005).
Therefore, this paper focuses on the second dividend issue in an overlapping generations
economy with the detrimental effect of pollution on health. Taking the environmental tax
rate as given, the tax revenues recycling is interpreted as a different form, i.e., the returning
towards labor income as well as pollution-mitigation activities. The second dividend is
defined on per-worker output and lifetime welfare. In this context, how to allocate the
environmental tax revenues to maximize steady-state lifetime welfare and per-worker output
at the theoretical level is the research question of this paper.
2. The Model
Consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) model of Diamond (1965) in which each in-
dividual lives two periods: adulthood and old-age. The number of individuals L born at time
t (t = 1, 2, · · · , T, T →∞) is constant. As adults, individuals are endowed with one unit of
labor which they supply inelastically to the market. In the model, we introduce the environ-
mental concerns and an associated health feedback effect. The recycling of environmental
tax revenues towards pollution abatement and labor income is also taken into account.
2.1. Pollution, health and the economic structure
Following Pautrel (2012), the pollution stock P at time t+1 is assumed to increase with
pollution emissions Et+1, decrease with the natural pollution absorption and abatement
activities Dt+1 funded by the government:
Pt+1 =
[
Et+1
Dt+1
]γ
+ (1− µ)Pt, γ > 0, 0 < µ < 1, (1)
where γ is the exogenous elasticity of pollution with respect to the ratio of emissions to
abatement services E/D, and µ is the natural pollution absorption rate. The pollution
emissions Et+1 arise from final production Yt+1 such that
Et+1 = zYt+1, 0 < z < 1, (2)
1
where z measures the polluting capacity of the technology. Abatement activities Dt+1 are
financed by a portion (1 − β) of the environmental tax revenues on the source of pollution
Yt+1, this is
Dt+1 = τ(1− β)Yt+1, 0 < τ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ β < 1. (3)
Following Pautrel (2009), we assume that public health at time t (denoted by ht) is
influenced negatively by the endogenous pollution stock Pt and positively by the exogenous
part of public health expenditures in GDP (denoted by θ) . This is
ht =
ηθ
ξP ϕt
, θ > 0, η > 0, ξ > 0, ϕ > 0, (4)
where η is the productivity of the health sector, ξ is a positive parameter, and ϕ measures
the influence of pollution on public health: a higher value of ϕ means that pollution harms
more public health. This assumption imposes that P > 1.
The health status of an individual has an important implication for labor market out-
comes. A worse health status makes a worker less productive. To capture the simple intu-
ition, we assume that final goods Yt are produced by using capital Kt and efficiency units of
labor hεtLt with a Cobb-Douglas technology. This is, Yt = AK
α
t (h
ε
tLt)
1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), where
A > 0 is a constant productivity parameter, and ε ≥ 0 captures the effect of health on labor
productivity. Output per worker is then
yt = Ak
α
t (h
ε
t )
1−α (5)
with k denoting capital per worker. Under perfect competition, firms maximize their profit
pit = (1− τ)yt−Rtkt−wt. The wage per effective unit of labor wt and interest factor Rt are
given, respectively, by
wt = A(1− τ)(1 − α)k
α
t (h
ε
t )
1−α, (6)
Rt = A(1− τ)αk
α−1
t (h
ε
t)
1−α. (7)
Consider a consumer who is born at time t. Let c1t and c2t+1 denote her consumption
when young and old, respectively. Her utility function is
Ut = ln c1t +
ln c2t+1
1 + ρ
, ρ > 0. (8)
Here ρ denotes the subjective discount rate. The consumer working at t earns a wage income
wt and a lump-sum transfer from environmental tax βτyt. She consumes an amount c1t, and
saves the remainder of her revenue st. So the budgets constraints are
c1t + st = wt + βτyt, (9)
c2t+1 = Rtst. (10)
The first-order condition for this utility maximization problem is given by
st = δ (wt + βτyt) , (11)
where the savings propensity δ = 1
2+ρ
is a decreasing function of the subjective discount rate.
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2.2. General equilibrium
In this model, we assume full depreciation on the capital. Therefore, competitive equi-
librium can be defined by1
kt+1 = δ [(1− α) (1− τ) + βτ ] yt (12)
Now it allows us to characterize the steady state as a general equilibrium. In other
words, per-worker capital, individual health status, pollution stock, per-worker output, and
the wage rate remain constant at any time at k∗, h∗, P ∗, y∗ and w∗, respectively. From
Eqs.(1)-(4), we have
P ∗ = P (β) ≡ (z/(1 − β)τ)γ/µ, (13)
h∗ = H(β) ≡
ηθµϕ
ξ
[
(1− β)τ
z
]ϕγ
. (14)
Consequently, health status is positively affected by the pollution abatement activities. From
Eqs.(5) and (12), the steady-state value of the per-worker capital stock is k∗ = k (β) ≡
{δ [(1− α) (1− τ) + βτ ]}
1
1−α (h∗)ε. The steady-state value of per-worker output as a function
of environmental tax swaps is:
y∗ = y (β) ≡ Φ[(1− α) (1− τ) + βτ ]
α
1−α (1− β)ϕγε (15)
with Φ = A
1
1−α δ
α
1−α
(
ηθµϕ
ξ
)ε(
τ
z
)ϕγε
. The steady-state wage rate is given by
w∗ = w(β) ≡ Φ (1− α) (1− τ) [(1− α) (1− τ) + βτ ]
α
1−α (1− β)ϕγε (16)
Finally, using Eqs.(8)-(12) and (15), we obtain the lifetime welfare along the balanced
growth path as follows:
U∗ = ln (1− δ)Φ
1
1−δ [α (1− τ )]
δ
1−δ + lnΩ (β) (17)
with Ω (β) = [(1− α) (1− τ ) + βτ ]
α
(1−α)(1−δ)
+1
(1− β)
ϕγε
1−δ .
Proposition 1. (i) Below (respectively above) a share of environmental tax revenues to-
wards labor income (βˆ) defined as
βˆ =
α
1−α
− ϕγε (1− α)
(
1
τ
− 1
)
α
1−α
+ ϕγε
(18)
if ϕrε(1−α)
2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
< τ ≤ 1, a higher shift to labor income raises (respectively lowers) the steady-
state level of output per worker y∗.
(ii) βˆ = 0, if 0 < τ ≤ ϕrε(1−α)
2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
.
Proof. The influence of recycling environmental tax revenues on the steady-state output
per worker is given by
1Note that kt+1 = st = δ (wt + βτyt) = δ [(1− α) (1− τ ) + βτ ] yt.
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∂y∗/∂β = y∗
{
ατ
(1−α)[(1−α)(1−τ)+βτ ]
− ϕγε
1−β
}
.
The sign of ∂y∗/∂β is positive if ατ
(1−α)[(1−α)(1−τ)+βτ ]
− ϕγε
1−β
> 0.
The LHS of the inequality is a decreasing monotonic function of β ∈ [0, 1) with lim
β→1
= −∞
and lim
β→0
= ατ/
[
(1− α)2(1− τ)
]
− ϕγε. Thus, there is a unique βˆ under which the in-
equality is verified. If lim
β→0
> 0, i.e., ϕrε(1− α)2/
[
α + ϕrε(1− α)2
]
< τ ≤ 1, the so-
lution for β̂ is defined by ατ/ {(1− α) [(1− α)(1− τ) + βτ ]} = ϕγε/ (1− β). This is,
βˆ = {[α/ (1− α)]− ϕγε (1− α) (τ−1 − 1)} / {[α/ (1− α)] + ϕγε}. For β < βˆ and β > βˆ,
we have ∂y∗/∂β > 0 and ∂y∗/∂β < 0, respectively. If lim
β→0
≤ 0, then βˆ = 0. When ϕ = 0,
the LHS of the inequality is independent of (1 − β) and positive, and therefore we have
∂y∗/∂β > 0.
In this paper, it is a policy mix for recycling tax revenues. A larger returning towards la-
bor income implies a lower returning towards abatement activities (and vice versa). When the
given environmental tax (τ) exceeds the value of ϕrε(1−α)
2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
, there is a need to diminish such
a huge income distortion by returning tax revenues towards income. Indeed, we are interested
in how the recycling of environmental tax revenues affects per-worker output. As shown in
Eq.(15), on the one hand, pollution abatement activities (1− β)τ funded by environmental
tax contribute to benefiting the health status of workers, thus increasing labor productivity
(positive, see (1− β)ϕγε). On the other hand, the sum-lump transfer βτ would reduce the
labor income distortion caused by environmental tax (1− α) (1− τ), leading to a higher
level of steady-state savings and physical-capital (positive, see [(1− α) (1− τ) + βτ ]
α
1−α ).
When ϕ = 0, public health is independent of pollution, and labor productivity is not
affected by the investment of pollution abatement, i.e., y∗ is independent of (1 − β)τ . In
such a case, the positive effect of abatement activities no longer holds. Hence, all of environ-
mental tax revenues are supposed to be shifted towards labor income without consideration
of pollution-related health damages.
Proposition 2. When the environmental tax is defined at
(
ϕrε(1−α)2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
, 1
]
, the returning
of tax revenues towards labor income will be more likely to improve the steady state level of
output per worker if the share of labor in output (1 − α) is low, the environmental tax τ is
high, the influence of pollution on health ϕ is low, the effect of health on labor productivity
ε is low, and the elasticity of pollution with respect to the ration of emissions to abatement
activities γ is low.
Proof. From Eq.(18), it is straightforward that ∂βˆ/∂α > 0, ∂βˆ/∂τ > 0, ∂βˆ/∂ϕ < 0,
∂βˆ/∂ε < 0, and ∂βˆ/∂γ < 0.
Proposition 3. (i) Below (respectively above) the optimal recycling of environmental tax
revenues towards labor income βˆU defined by
βˆU =
α
1−α
+ 1− δ − ϕγε (1− α)
(
1
τ
− 1
)
α
1−α
+ ϕγε+ 1− δ
(19)
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with ϕγε(1−α)
2
δα+1−δ+ϕγε(1−α)2
< τ ≤ 1, a higher shift to labor income raises (respectively lowers)
lifetime welfare.
(ii) βˆU = 0 if 0 < τ ≤
ϕγε(1−α)2
δα+1−δ+ϕγε(1−α)2
.
Proof. From Eq.(17), we can obatin
∂U∗
∂β
= τ(1+αδ−δ)
[(1−α)(1−τ )+βτ ](1−α)(1−δ)
− ϕγε
(1−δ)(1−β)
.
Because the LHS of the inequality is a monotonic decreasing function of β ∈ [0, 1) with
lim
β→1
= −∞ and lim
β→0
= τ (1 + αδ − δ) /
[
(1− α)2 (1− δ) (1− τ)
]
− ϕγε/ (1− δ). Hence,
there is a unique βˆU under which the inequality is verified. This is defined by ∂U
∗/∂β = 0
if lim
β→0
> 0. In other words, βˆU =
[
α
1−α
+ 1− δ − ϕγε (1− α)
(
1
τ
− 1
)]
/
(
α
1−α
+ ϕγε+ 1− δ
)
if ϕrε(1− α)2/
[
δα + 1− δ + ϕrε(1− α)2
]
< τ ≤ 1. When β < βˆU and β > βˆU , we have
∂U∗/∂β > 0 and ∂U∗/∂β < 0, respectively. If lim
β→0
≤ 0, then βˆU = 0.
Propositions 1 and 3 lead to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (i) If 0 < τ ≤ ϕrε(1−α)
2
δα+1−δ+ϕrε(1−α)2
, βˆ = βˆU = 0. When 0 < β < 1, then
∂y∗/∂β < 0 and ∂U∗/∂β < 0.
(ii) If ϕrε(1−α)
2
δα+1−δ+ϕrε(1−α)2
< τ ≤ ϕrε(1−α)
2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
, then βˆU > βˆ = 0. When 0 < β < βˆU then
∂y∗/∂β < 0 and ∂U∗/∂β > 0, and when βˆU < β < 1 then ∂y
∗/∂β < 0 and ∂U∗/∂β < 0.
(iii) If ϕrε(1−α)
2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
< τ ≤ 1, then βˆU > βˆ > 0. When 0 < β < βˆ then ∂y
∗/∂β > 0 and
∂U∗/∂β > 0. When β̂ < β < βˆU then ∂y
∗/∂β < 0 and ∂U∗/∂β > 0, and when βˆU < β < 1
then ∂y∗/∂β < 0 and ∂U∗/∂β < 0.
Proof. From Eqs.(18)-(19), we can obtain
βˆU − βˆ =
ϕγε(1−δ)[τ+(1−α)(1−τ)]
τ( α1−α+ϕγε+1−δ)(
α
1−α
+ϕγε)
> 0 if ϕrε(1−α)
2
α+ϕrε(1−α)2
< τ ≤ 1.
Corollary 1 means that the positive impact of a larger shift towards labor income on the
steady-state lifetime welfare might have a detrimental impact on per-worker output if the
environmental tax τ is defined from ϕrε(1−α)
2
δα+1−δ+ϕrε(1−α)2
to 1. This follows from the fact that
the net welfare effect is the sum of an output effect and an income effect (see the last term
in Eq. (17)). As a result, if ϕγε(1−α)
2
δα+1−δ+ϕγε(1−α)2
< τ ≤ 1, when 0 < β < βˆ a larger shift towards
labor income leads to a positive output effect and a positive income effect, thus enhancing
both the steady-state lifetime welfare and per-worker output; when β̂ < β < βˆU a larger shift
leads to a negative output effect but a positive income effect, and the former effect is smaller
than the latter, thus enhancing the lifetime welfare but reducing per-worker output; when
βˆU < β < 1 a larger shift leads to a negative output effect and a positive income effect, and
the former effect exceeds the latter, thus diminishing both the steady-state lifetime welfare
and per-worker output.
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3. Conclusions
This paper takes the pollution-related health damage into account in a simple OLG model
and finds that the recycling of environmental tax revenues towards pollution abatement and
labor income contributes to maximizing steady-state economy variables (per-worker output
and welfare). One policy implication is the need to continue and reinforce efforts to provide
a substantial shift of tax revenues towards abatement activity and a relatively small shift
towards labor income in economies where the health is very pollution-sensitive and where
industries is labor-intensive. The other one is that the per-worker output implication of any
environmental policy should be carefully taken into account to avoid the situation where
there is a negative impact on per-worker output from the allocation of environmental tax
revenues while lifetime welfare is increased.
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